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Abstract
The baseball card industry provides a case study of survival in a declining industry.
The case study shows how manufacturers have varied their strategic behavior in re-
sponse to changes that have occurred within the industry in the last 20 years. This is
in stark contrast to most of the existing theoretical literature on behavior in declining
industries, which assumes that behavior remains constant throughout the decline phase
of an industry.
1 Introduction
The phrase “declining industry” is enough to make any business manager shudder. Declin-
ing industries often portend proﬁt reductions, plant closings, and layoﬀs. The picture of
declining industries painted by economic theorists is just as dismal. The typical theoretical
analysis has ﬁrms hanging on until they are just barely proﬁtable, then exiting the market.
While this model may ﬁt some industries, it ignores the possibility that ﬁrms may change
their strategic behavior to stave oﬀ the disappearance of the industry.
In this paper, I provide a case study of an industry which underwent such a change in
strategic behavior, the baseball card industry. While secondary market values for baseball
cards have been used in studies on consumer discrimination,1 baseball player salaries,2 and in
ﬁeld experiments,3 little attention has been paid to the manufacture and release of baseball
cards. An early paper, Jones and Warhit [11], focuses on the tieing of baseball cards to
bubblegum by the then-monopoly producer of baseball cards, the Topps Company (Topps).
Stoller [22] discusses the antitrust case decided in 1980 that led to new competitors in
the baseball card industry. He also mentions that the baseball card industry will be an
∗I would like to thank Robert Plapinger and James Mason for help in ﬁlling in some missing data. Greg
Burge provided value comments. As always, I remain responsible for any remaining errors.
1See Nardinelli and Simon [19]; Anderson and La Croix [2]; Gabriel, Johnson, and Stanton [5]; and
McGarrity, Palmer, and Poitras [16]
2See Mullin and Dunn [17] and Gill and Brajer [8].
3See Harrison and List [9] and List and Lucking-Reilly [14].
1interesting industry to observe, as one of the key aspects in any collectibles industries is
rarity. In the early 1980s, manufacturers achieved rarity by producing error cards, which
were cards that contained incorrect information, such as mismatched names and photos.
Stoller wonders if these “low-quality” goods, as he called error cards, would become the
norm in the industry. While manufacturers recognized the importance of rarity, by the
early 1990s they had found new ways to create rare cards, and by the late 1990s error cards
were almost completely eliminated from products. Jin and Kato [10] discuss one aspect of
the manufacture of baseball cards, the increase in the number of insert sets, and attribute
this increase to lower search costs provided by online sellers. The period from 1983-1997,
which encompasses the expansion and decline of the industry, is essentially uncovered by the
previous research. However, it is during this period that most new entrants and changes in
strategic behavior occurred. In fact, despite sagging revenues in the early 1990s, ﬁrms still
wished to enter the market. This fact is irreconcilable with the predictions of the theoretical
literature described below.
Theoretical work on exit behavior in declining industries can be traced to Ghemawat and
Nalebuﬀ [6], Fudenberg and Tirole [4], Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ [7], and Londregan [15]. In
[6], the authors found that larger ﬁrms would exit before their smaller counterparts because
smaller ﬁrms could remain viable for a longer portion of the decline phase of the industry.
Their second paper, [7], extends the ﬁrst model by allowing ﬁrms to change capacities,
which ﬁrms were unable to do in [6]. They ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms will shrink to the level
of smaller ﬁrms, and then both will continuously phase out production at the same rate.
The results in [15] generalize those in [6] by allowing ﬁrms to exit and reenter the market.
In [4], they construct a duopoly model where the ﬁrms have diﬀerent per period ﬁxed or
opportunity costs. They ﬁnd that the ﬁrm with the higher per period cost will leave the
market ﬁrst. A more recent paper is Murto [18], which incorporates an exit model into the
real-options framework. He introduces uncertainty in the path of ﬁrm proﬁt, and ﬁnds that
the size of the ﬁrm that will exit ﬁrst depends on the degree of uncertainty. These papers
ignore the possibility that strategic behavior may change over time, either by assuming that
ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition or by leaving the manner in which the ﬁrms compete
unspeciﬁed. van Witteloostuijn [23] provides a review of this line of literature, and states
that the ﬁrm’s inability to change strategic behavior during the decline phase is a drawback
of these theoretical models.
This case study of the baseball card industry shows how changes in the method of compe-
tition can sustain an industry. The baseball card industry peaked under traditional modes
of behavior, and had manufacturers continued using those methods the industry likely would
have disappeared due to high licensing fees. Thus, the paper diﬀers from traditional case
studies of exit behavior which focus on obsolescence or the failure to adopt new technologies
as the reasons for the decline.
Section 2 of the paper discusses some background information on the baseball card indus-
try, paying particular attention to changes in the number and composition of manufacturing
ﬁrms. For a more thorough review, see Zillante [25]. Section 3 provides an overview of
manufacturer behavior during the expansion era in the industry, and section 4 discusses how
that behavior changed as the industry entered its decline in the early 1990s. Section 5
concludes.
22 Background Information
F r o mt h el a t e1 9 th century until World War I, baseball cards were used almost exclusively
as a promotional item to sell more of a product, typically tobacco or candy.4 After World
War I, baseball cards were used as a promotional item with a new confectionery product,
bubblegum. However, due to the depression and the onset of World War II, the production
of baseball cards was temporarily halted. In 1948, the Leaf Company and the Bowman
Gum Company were the ﬁrst to include baseball cards with bubblegum after World War II,
b u tt h e yw e r es o o nf o l l o w e db yT o p p sC h e w i n g Gum Company (Topps). Although baseball
cards were still considered promotional items, from 1952-1955 Topps and Bowman competed
vigorously to sign Major League Baseball (MLB) players to exclusive contracts to appear on
their cards. When Topps purchased Bowman in 1955, this essentially ended the competition
for exclusive contracts, although the Fleer Corporation (Fleer) would compete with Topps on
a limited basis. In the 1960s and 1970s, various lawsuits were brought against Topps. The
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) ﬁled suit against Topps on February 8th, 1962, charging
Topps with monopolizing the baseball card industry. Although the FTC action in 1962
failed, Fleer ﬁled a lawsuit in June of 1975 accusing Topps of illegal restraint of trade,
citing an inability to enter the market due to Topps’ exclusive contracts. Fleer won this
case,5 and was granted licenses by MLB and the MLBPA to produce baseball cards in 1981.
Topps’ primary claim throughout these proceedings was that they were not monopolizing an
industry because there was no industry to be monopolized, as the baseball cards were just
an advertising gimmick used to sell more bubblegum.
After the decision in Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 1980, two new licenses were
granted in 1981. Fleer obtained one and the Donruss Company (Donruss) obtained the
other, and for that year only, Fleer and Donruss produced bubblegum that was packaged
with baseball cards. In 1981, the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, ruled
that Topps did have the exclusive right to produce and sell baseball cards with confectionery
products,6 as well as the right to sell baseball cards as a stand alone product. To circumvent
this legal ﬁnding, Fleer released its baseball cards with stickers in 1982, while Donruss oﬀered
a puzzle piece. Thus, the last link between baseball cards as a promotional tool was broken,
as the intent of both Fleer and Donruss was to produce and sell baseball cards, not stickers
and puzzle pieces.
The baseball card manufacturers are deﬁned as the producers of nationally distributed
picture cards of major league baseball players, licensed by Major League Baseball and either
the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) or the individual MLB players.
Since ﬁrms must be granted licenses by MLB and the MLBPA to produce cards that appeal
to collectors on a national basis, entry into the industry is controlled by those two enti-
ties.7 Cards that appeal to collectors have a player’s likeness depicted on the card and the
4Information on the use of baseball cards as advertising tools in the tobacco and candy industries prior
t oW o r l dW a rI Ic a nb eo b t a i n e df r o man u m b e ro fd i ﬀerent sources, including Kirk [13] and most of the
annual comprehensive baseball card price guides produced by Beckett Publishing or Krause Publications.
5See Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 1980
6See Topps Chewing Gum v. Fleer Corporation, 1981
7In the late 1980s and early 1990s, manufacturers such as Classic, Frontline, Action Packed, and Starline
were denied entry by either MLB or the MLBPA.
3MLB logo of the player’s team, past or current. It should be noted that not all manufac-
turers secure licenses from both sources. One manufacturer, Michael Schechter Associates
(MSA), has never acquired a national license from MLB. MSA has acquired licenses from
the MLBPA, airbrushing out any part of the team logos on the players’ uniforms that appear
in the picture so as not to infringe on any of MLB’s trademarks. However, these cards are
not fully embraced by consumers; as such, MSA and similar manufacturers are not included
as a baseball card manufacturer. As for the general terms of the license, MLB has a stan-
dard royalty rate of 11% for national retail product licenses, as well as minimum annual
guarantees which vary depending on the product classiﬁcation. The MLBPA has similar
rates. The MLBPA also has to approve the ﬁnal product, and may make suggestions to the
manufacturers about the design and price of the product.8
2.1 New Competitors
The three manufacturers produced card sets for seven years with little competition. The
years 1981-1987 were the beginning of the expansion years of the baseball card industry, fu-
eled primarily by investors stockpiling cards. Although there were numerous unlicensed card
sets issued during this time, only Optigraphics, Inc., which produced the Sportﬂics brand of
baseball cards, was granted a license by MLB and the MLBPA. Sportﬂics was introduced
in 1986, and were actually quite diﬀerent from traditional baseball cards. Sportﬂics cards
have three pictures that appear on the card front depending on the angle at which the card
is held. Some of the cards, if moved quickly enough, showed a player “in action”, either
swinging a bat, pitching, or ﬁelding a ball. Since they were so diﬀerent from the traditional
cards, Sportﬂics were viewed more as a novelty than a mainstream brand, and their inclusion
as a competitor to Topps, Fleer, and Donruss is borderline. However, in 1988 Optigraphics
produced the Score brand of baseball cards, adding a fourth manufacturer and a ﬁfth brand
of cards, as they continued to produce the Sportﬂics brand in 1988.
In 1989, MLB and the MLBPA granted licenses to a ﬁfth manufacturer, the Upper Deck
Company (Upper Deck). Upper Deck was the ﬁrst company created solely to produce
sportscards. Upper Deck revolutionized the hobby by introducing high quality cards as a
mainstream product. From 1989 until 1995, the baseball card industry would consist of ﬁve
producers: Topps, Fleer, Donruss, Pinnacle (formerly Optigraphics), and Upper Deck. An
additional license was granted to Paciﬁc Trading Cards, Incorporated (Paciﬁc) in 1993, but it
was not a full license. Paciﬁc could only produce cards that were bilingual (English/Spanish)
in nature, and Paciﬁc released at most two brands a year from 1993 to 1997.
In April 1996, Pinnacle acquired Donruss, which reduced the number of fully-licensed
manufacturers from ﬁve to four. In May 1998, Paciﬁc was granted a full license to produce
cards, returning the number of fully-licensed manufacturers to ﬁve. However, Pinnacle
would ﬁle for bankruptcy in July 1998, reducing the number of manufacturers to four, and
the brand names of Donruss and Leaf would be acquired by a non-licensed company, Playoﬀ,
Incorporated (Playoﬀ).9 Although Playoﬀ was allowed to release two products that Pinnacle
had already manufactured in 1998, it was unable to purchase the license to produce cards,
8This process is discussed in O’Shei [20].
9Although Playoﬀ was not licensed by MLB and the MLBPA, it had been producing cards for other
sports, primarily football.
4and it was not granted a license by MLB and the MLBPA until February 2001. However,
the number of fully-licensed manufacturers did not return to ﬁve in 2001 as Paciﬁcd i d
not renew its license to produce baseball cards. Thus, the number of manufacturers has
remained relatively stable at 4 or 5 since 1989.
2.2 Revenue Trends
The time period from 1981-1991 is generally viewed as the expansion era in the sportscard
industry, which was fueled by a few factors. The primary factor was the signiﬁcant spike in
prices of cards from the 1950s and 1960s. The price spike for the older material arose due
to an increase in demand, as baby boomers, now entering their peak earning years, sought
items from their youth. Additionally, supply of the older material was restricted as large
quantities of cards from the 1950s and 1960s were lost in spring cleaning and bicycle spokes.
Due to these factors, returns on sportscards, particularly baseball cards, could easily reach
triple digit percentages. The fourth column of table 1 lists the book value for one of the most
popular post-war baseball cards, the 1952 Topps Mickey Mantle. The price in the table is for
ac a r di nn e a rm i n tc o n d i t i o n , 10 taken from the Sportamericana Price Guide for 1978, 1979,
and 1981, and from the October issue of the Beckett Baseball Card Monthly magazines for
1986-present. As the table shows, the Mantle card posted large returns until 1992, peaking
around $33,000. While the Mantle card is the most notable, many older cards posted returns
that were equally impressive, attracting investors and speculators into both the vintage card
market as well as the new card market in the 1980s. Due to the increase in consumers
in the mid-to-late 1980s and early 1990s, production of the new products increased. This
increased production would lead to depressed secondary market values for products from the
late 1980s and early 1990s. With secondary market values depressed, the investors began
to exit the market.
Table 1 shows the estimated revenues of new product sales for the sportscard industry
from selected years from 1978-2001, taken from Ambrosius [1]. Note that revenues from
new card sales increased from 1981-1991 even as competition increased over this time period.
While this ﬁgure is for the entire sportscard industry, the general trend holds for the 3 major
individual sports (baseball, football, and basketball), although the sports may have slightly
diﬀerent peaks and troughs due to diﬀerent periods of peak interest and labor strife in the
sport. Estimates from [1] state that baseball card sales constituted 85% of the sales in 1989,
60% in 1994, and 40% in 1995. Thus, it appears that baseball cards are falling at a faster
rate than other sports, although that trend may have begun to reverse recently.
Although proﬁt levels for manufacturers and the industry as a whole are unavailable, the
data in table 1 suggest that proﬁts are declining. First, total revenue is declining. While
this does not necessarily imply that proﬁts are falling, the third column of table 1 shows how
the number of sets has changed over time. The increase in the number of sets means that
more photographs must be taken, more border designs for the cards must be created, and
the printing presses must be changed more often to accommodate more sets. In addition,
the quality level of the cards has improved over time, which has also increased costs.
10Note that the price is not for a professionally graded near mint card as the professional card grading
industry did not exist for a portion of this time period.
5Year New card salesa #o fb r a n d s Revenue per branda 1952 Topps Mickey Mantle Price
1978 $9 5 $1.8 ≈ $100b
1979 $10 5 $2.0 $500
1981 $30 7 $4.3 $1,500
1988 $250 8 $31.3 $6,500
1989 $450 12 $37.5 $6,600
1990 $800 24 $33.3 $7,500
1991 $1200 35 $34.3 $20,000
1992 $1100 46 $23.9 $33,000
1993 $850 58 $14.7 $25,000
1994 $800 81 $9.8 $26,000
1995 $700 111 $6.3 $25,000
1996 $575 137 $5.1 $25,000
1997 $500 151 $3.3 $24,000
1998 $450 148 $3.0 $23,000
1999 $425 185 $2.3 $18,000
2000 $400 210 $1.9 $18,000
2001 $350 212 $1.7 $18,000
a In millions of $, unadjusted for inﬂation
b Card prices for 1978 are not listed for individual cards, but rather by the card’s series, so this is an approximate value
Table 1: Estimated sportscard industry revenues from new card sales for selected years from
1978-2001
There has also been a surge in insert cards over the past 10 years, which require even
more printing press changes since insert cards are typically designed diﬀerently and produced
at a lower rate than regular cards. Two important types of insert cards were created in the
1990s. One was the certiﬁed autograph, ﬁrst used in 1990 by Upper Deck. The second was
the game-used memorabilia card, which is a card that has a piece of the pictured player’s
memorabilia (jersey, bat, cap, glove, etc.) embedded into the card. Game-used memorabilia
cards were introduced by Upper Deck in 1997. Both of these types of cards increase the
costs to the manufacturers, both in material costs (the autograph or the memorabilia), and
in production costs.
3 Expansion Era Industry Behavior
From 1981-1983, Topps was viewed as the industry leader. All three ﬁrms had a suggested
retail price (SRP) of $0.30 per pack in 1981, although Fleer and Donruss oﬀered 17 and
18 cards per pack, respectively, to Topps’ 15 cards per pack. For 1982 and 1983, all
manufacturers included 15 cards per pack with a SRP of $0.30. A card pack is the smallest
unit of a manufacturer’s product available for sale in most retail stores that do not specialize
in sports cards. During those years, all manufacturers essentially engaged in Bertrand
competition by following a “print to order” business plan, where they would continue printing
cards until there was no remaining demand. In 1984, both Fleer and Donruss improved
6the quality of their card sets, and also restricted quantity. This quantity reduction may
be viewed as an attempt at Cournot competition by Fleer and Donruss, although the SRP
of their packs of cards did not diﬀer from Topps’. While it is diﬃcult to pinpoint exactly
when this Cournot competition ended, current secondary market values for products from
1989-1992 are among the lowest valued and most equal across manufacturer in the hobby,
suggesting that a return to Bertrand c o m p e t i t i o nm a yh a v eb e g u ni n1 9 8 9 .
This return to Bertrand competition was driven by consumer behavior during this time
period, as the investment frenzy was peaking. Lots for 50 and 100 of the same card were
bought and sold regularly, almost as if the cards were shares of stock. Although near the
end of the expansion period, the February 4, 1991 issue of Baseball Card News & Price Guide
has 8 full or half page advertisements with dealers oﬀe r i n g5 0a n d1 0 0c a r dl o t sf o rd o z e n so f
diﬀerent cards. That same issue contains two segments that convey the investment mentality
common during this time. Pietruska [21] is an article about how to invest your money in
baseball cards. Brecka [3] is an investment guide, which oﬀers tips on which products from
1960-1990 are most likely to increase in value in the coming years, and why these products
should increase in value. This investment guide diﬀers from typical price guides, which show
lagged market prices for cards.
A change that occurred near the end of the expansion era was improved product quality.
While product quality improvement was occurring slowly throughout the 1980s, it was the
introduction of Upper Deck in 1989 that launched the onset of premium and super-premium
brands. Premium and super-premium brands were typically printed on high quality card
stock rather than cardboard, and most premium and super-premium brands were coated
with some type of ﬁnish (e.g. ultra-violet coating) to give the cards a glossy look and feel.
Other manufacturers, perhaps reluctant to change their basic brands, launched second and
third product lines in an attempt to produce at least one product in the basic, premium, and
super-premium categories. In response to this, Upper Deck, which is viewed as a premium
brand, began releasing a slightly lower quality brand in 1994, Collector’s Choice, to compete
with the other manufacturers’ lower quality brands.
Another change that occurred during the end of the expansion period was the introduction
of insert sets into products. An insert set is a set of cards which can be found in a speciﬁc
product, but which (typically) has a production run lower than that of the primary set.
While the insert concept was not new (Topps had inserted items such as coins and posters in
the 1960s), the type of cards included as inserts was. Upper Deck inserted a special 10 card
insert set of Reggie Jackson for its 1990 product. It also inserted 2,500 serial-numbered
copies of an autographed version of a Reggie Jackson card. Both the serial-numbering
AND the autograph were important innovations. The serial-numbering assured collectors
that only a speciﬁc quantity of a card existed, at a time when there was speculation that
some companies were overprinting certain cards with high secondary market values.11 The
autograph simply added to the appeal of the card. Over the next few years, other types of
inserts, such as game-used memorabilia cards, which feature a piece of a player’s game-used
equipment embedded into the card, would be introduced into products. One key feature
of the market is that any successful concept can be quickly copied by other manufacturers,
creating a very short window during which the innovating ﬁrm can capture economic proﬁts.
11See Williams [24] for a discussion of these accusations against Upper Deck.
7Thus, while these innovations may lead to a short-term proﬁt increase, they typically cannot
be used to increase long-term proﬁts.
The expansion era industry behavior is similar to other industries, as existing ﬁrms
engaged in traditional Bertrand or Cournot competition, and additional ﬁrms attempted to
enter the market. In addition, manufacturers began to compete on other margins, such as
quality, during the expansion period. What sets the baseball card industry apart from other
industries is the manner in which behavior changed during the decline era, discussed in the
next section.
4 Decline Era Industry Behavior
As table 1 shows, the decline in revenue began around 1991, when the investors/speculators
began to exit the market, and was exacerbated by the MLBPA strike in 1994. These two
factors left the manufacturers with a small core of consumers as their customer base. With
the exit of the investors, most remaining collectors had no use for lots of 50 or 100 of the same
card. Thus, changes had to occur within the industry for the manufacturers to fulﬁll their
licensing agreements. Two primary changes occurred in the industry due to the decline.
One change was that manufacturers increased the prices of their products. Perhaps the
most important change was that manufacturers cut production runs of each product and
began issuing multiple products throughout the year. These changes are discussed below.
4.1 Price Increases
One change that has occurred in the market is that the SRP of packs has increased. Ac-
cording to Keifer [12], improvements in card quality and increases in costs of production are
two possible reasons for the price increase. A third reason may be that after the MLBPA
strike in 1994, the consumer base of baseball cards shrank signiﬁc a n t l y ,a sf a n sw i t hm e r e l y
a passing interest in baseball turned to other hobbies. Due to this exogenous factor that
caused consumers with elastic demand to exit the market, manufacturers could raise prices
and not lose the remaining consumers, as those consumers who remained in the market had
inelastic demand.
Figure 1 shows the SRP for a pack of the Topps brand of cards and the SRP per card
per pack, with the left axis corresponding to SRP and the right axis to SRP per card per
pack. The Topps brand is used for two reasons. First, the brand was produced each year
from 1980-2004. Second, SRPs are readily available for all years, as Topps pre-printed SRPs
for packs on its boxes of cards for the early years, and then on the packs of the cards in the
later years. Although some SRP data is missing for other manufacturers, the SRP for their
products follows a similar qualitative pattern.
Throughout the 1980s, Topps’ pack price either remained constant or increased in in-
crements of 5 cents each year. The SRP per card is approximately 7% of the SRP from
1980-1993, as Topps typically included 15 cards per pack in each of these years. The largest
increase in SRP is from 1994 to 1995, as the SRP jumped from 79c /t o$ 1 . 2 9 ,a ni n c r e a s e
of 63%. The increase in SRP per card is even higher, as Topps also decreased the number





















































Figure 2: Number of brands produced by manufacturer, 1988-2003
both SRP and SRP per card remain relatively constant until the year 2000. While this
stagnation may have occurred due to the fact that consumers with low valuations returned
to the market, their return may not be the only reason. As the next section shows, the
number of products produced by each manufacturer was increasing, allowing manufacturers
to price discriminate among consumers.
4.2 Number of brands increase
The key behavioral change in the industry was in the number of products each manufacturer
released over the course of a year and when they released the products. Figure 2 shows the
number of brands each manufacturer released from 1988 to 2003. Only brands available
for sale in wax packs and wax boxes are included in the ﬁgure; brands available only as
boxed-sets are not counted, although their inclusion will not change the qualitative nature
of the picture. Boxed sets are excluded because they typically appeal to a diﬀerent type
of consumer than the primary consumer type in the market, which is the wax pack or wax
box purchaser. Also, most boxed-sets currently produced are also available in wax pack
or wax box form. For completeness, during the time period from 1981-1987, the 3 major
manufacturers, Topps, Donruss, and Fleer, all released one brand per year.12
The general trend is that each manufacturer gradually increases its number of brands
12The end of the season Traded, Rookies, and Update brands were only available in boxed set form in the
early 1980s, and thus are not included.
10over time. There are a few large changes in the number of brands released, which are easily
explained. Between 1996 and 1997, Pinnacle w e n tf r o mp r o d u c i n g1 0b r a n d st o1 8b r a n d s .
This increase was due to the purchase of the Donruss and Leaf brand names. In 1998, Paciﬁc
increased their number of brands from 2 to 8 because they were granted a full license in 1998.
Paciﬁc’s decline from 11 brands in 2000 to 2 brands in 2001 was due to their decision not
to renew their MLB license. The other two large increases, Upper Deck from 7 in 1998 to
17 in 1999 and Topps from 14 in 2000 to 21 in 2001, stem from an increase in demand for
MLB-related products following the pursuit of the single season homerun record in MLB by
Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa in 1998. Upper Deck’s increase in its number of brands is
almost certainly related to that increase in demand, and Topps’ increase in brands in 2001
is likely a combination of renewed demand for MLB-related products and the fact that 2001
marked Topps’ 50th anniversary as a manufacturer.
4.3 Timing of product releases
In addition to increasing the number of products, the manufacturers also changed the timing
of the releases. During the expansion period, when each manufacturer released one product
per year, the product was typically released between the end of one baseball season (October)
and the beginning of the next (April). During the expansion, there was some competition
among manufacturers in their release strategies, as each manufacturer attempted to be the
ﬁrst one to market with its product, and release dates for products moved closer towards
October. As the number of brands increased, manufacturers spread the release of these
brands over the calendar year. In a sense, manufacturers began to engage in a type of
temporal Hotelling game, where the object is to release a product at a point in time that did
not coincide with another manufacturer’s new product release. If the manufacturers play
the temporal Hotelling game “perfectly”, then each product release will be equidistant from
t h ep r e v i o u sp r o d u c tr e l e a s ea sw e l la st h ep r o d u c tr e l e a s et h a tf o l l o w si t .
Figures 3 and 4 show the release patterns by manufacturer for the calendar year 2002.13
Figure 3 shows the releases from January 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002, while ﬁgure 4 shows the
releases from July 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002. All releases are included, whether they
are labeled 2001, 2002, or 2003 products by the manufacturer. Any releases labeled 2002
that occurred before January 1, 2002 or after December 31, 2002 are not included in the
ﬁgures. Points that are set slightly above the others correspond to packs with SRPs greater
than $9.99, which are currently considered the high-end products.
The 2002 calendar year is not a special case; the other years from 1998-2004 show similar
patterns. I focus on the 2002 calendar year because I have complete data for that year; other
years are missing between 1 and 4 product releases, and the data prior to 1998 is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd. Also, 2002 is the year during which the products are least equally spaced. This may
be due to a few factors, such as Playoﬀ being a competitor for an entire year, as well as the
threat of a strike by the MLBPA in August 2002.
Over the 2002 calendar year there were 82 products released by the four manufacturers.14
13Most release dates were taken from Sports Collector’s Digest (SCD), a weekly sportscard publication.
For those that were unavailable from SCD, dates from Beckett Publications’ magazines and online site were
used.
14There are a few instances where the same manufacturer released more than one product on the same





Figure 3: Time series of product releases by manufacturer from 1/1/2002 — 6/30/2002





Figure 4: Time series of product releases by manufacturer from 7/1/2002 — 12/31/2002
12The gridlines on the ﬁgures are set at 4.5 days, which is approximately the average amount
of time that passes between releases. If the temporal Hotelling model is followed exactly,
this implies that the releases would be perfectly spaced, with one release between each set
of gridlines. While this is not the case, the general pattern is that ﬁrms are attempting to
space their releases over time. Some of the clusters have simple explanations. In June,
Fleer released 4 products in a little over two “market periods”. As mentioned, there was
a threat of a strike by the MLBPA in August 2002. Fleer was the manufacturer which
responded to the potential strike by pushing up its release dates. Note that Fleer released
very few products in ﬁgure 4. There are two other periods when all manufacturers tend to
release at the same time. One is mid-November, which is when all manufacturers typically
release their ﬁrst products for the just completed season. Thus, those products released in
mid-November in ﬁgure 4 are the ﬁrst 2003 products to hit the market.
The second time that all manufacturers clustered was at the end of the calendar year.
This clustering occurs because of the demand for players’ rookie cards, which was an impor-
tant factor in determining product success during the expansion era of the industry, and is
an important factor for determining success in some products since behavior has changed.
Although the deﬁnition of a rookie card has changed over time, it is generally deﬁned by
the hobby as the ﬁrst nationally distributed card of a player in a brand of cards, as long
as that player has not had a card in a brand of cards from the manufacturer of that brand
or another manufacturer in an earlier year. The end of the calendar year represents the
last point in time at which a manufacturer can release a product that can contain a player’s
rookie card for the current calendar year. As an example, if the ﬁrst card of Player A was
produced in 2002, any product released in 2001 or 2002 and labelled a 2002 product by the
manufacturer would be considered a rookie card, but cards of Player A in products that are
released in 2003 would not be. Thus, there are two reasons for the late year release. One is
to include rookie cards of players who already have rookie cards in other brands throughout
the calendar year, and the other is to possibly release a card of a player who did not yet
have a rookie card. If Player A had not had a card produced in a prior year, and his ﬁrst
card was released in December of 2002 in a product labelled 2002 by the manufacturer,15
this would likely be the only rookie card of Player A ever produced, giving that product a
distinct advantage in the market over other products, particularly if Player A was a young
player considered a high-level prospect.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The theoretical literature on declining industries portrays gloom and doom for such indus-
tries. While this may be the case for industries in which leaders remain stagnant, there are
cases where innovation in strategic behavior slows, and perhaps stops, the decline phase of
the industry. The baseball card industry provides one such example of changes in strategic
behavior, as manufacturers moved from each releasing one product at the same point in time
day or on consecutive days, resulting in slightly less than 82 releases on the ﬁgures.
15The labeling is an important point, as some of the products released in November and December of
one calendar year are actually considered the next calendar year’s products due to the designation by the
manufacturer.
13in the year to each releasing multiple products throughout the course of the year.
The facts presented about the baseball card industry show how quickly manufacturer
behavior changed during a twenty year time period. Initially, the strategic behavior of
manufacturers can be explained by the traditional industrial organization models of Bertrand
and Cournot behavior. Even as new entrants entered the market during the expansion era,
those models seem applicable. However, after the MLBPA strike in 1994, the Bertrand
and Cournot models do not seem as appropriate, as manufacturers increased the number of
products in the market, and began to release them over the calendar year, rather than all
at the same time. Faced with the problem of a shrinking consumer base, manufacturers
adjusted their behavior in an eﬀort to capture more dollars from those consumers still in the
market.
This case study shows that theoretical models that attempt to explain behavior in declin-
ing industries should begin to focus on the behavioral assumptions of the ﬁrms in the industry.
Perhaps models from evolutionary game theory can be used as a starting point. While the
task may be diﬃcult, an understanding of when an industry may need to switch behavior
could have a signiﬁcant impact in industries entering a decline phase.
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